Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection by Lence, Sergio H et al.
Economics Publications Economics
2016
Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing
different levels and forms of protection
Sergio H. Lence
Iowa State University, shlence@iastate.edu
Dermot J. Hayes
Iowa State University, dhayes@iastate.edu
Julian M. Alston
University of California, Davis
John Stephen C. Smith
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Economic History Commons,
Growth and Development Commons, and the Industrial Organization Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/577. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and
forms of protection
Abstract
Welfare trade-offs between intellectual property (IP) protections provided by patents and by plant variety
protection (PVP) are explored. PVP breeders’ exemption weakens IP protection, but may speed the transfer
of research gains across firms. A model is developed assuming firms optimise research given existing IP
protection. A baseline scenario supporting each system is used to perform welfare analysis, and study how the
balance is altered between systems. Survey data suggest patents are more appropriate for longer-term, higher-
risk research, whereas PVP is better suited for traditional breeding. A scenario where patents and licensing co-
exist dominates PVP in all commercially relevant areas.
Keywords
genetic improvement, intellectual property, seed industry, welfare analysis
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Economic History | Growth and Development | Industrial
Organization
Comments
This article is published as Lence, Sergio H., Dermot J. Hayes, Julian M. Alston, and John Stephen C. Smith.
"Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection." European
Review of Agricultural Economics 43, no. 1 (2015): 1-29. 10.1093/erae/jbv007. Posted with permission.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/577
Intellectual property in plant breeding:
comparing different levels and forms
of protection
Sergio H. Lence*,†, Dermot J. Hayes†,‡, Julian M. Alston§
and John Stephen C. Smith**
†Iowa State University, Ames, USA; ‡Iowa State University, Ames, USA;
§University of California, Davis, USA; **Pioneer Hi-Bred International,
Inc., DuPont Agriculture and Nutrition, Johnston, IA, USA
Received February 2014; final version accepted January 2015
Review coordinated by Steve McCorriston
Abstract
Welfare trade-offs between intellectual property (IP) protections provided by patents
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1. Introduction
There are pressing needs to sustainably increase agricultural productivity to
meet expanding global demands for food (Dobermann and Nelson, 2013).
Investments in plant breeding by both the private and public sectors have a
proven track record of allowing more production per unit area of land and
thus of significantly contributing to economic well-being (Fehr, 1984; Frisvold,
Sullivan and Raneses, 1999; Duvick, 2005; Rubenstein et al., 2005; British
Society of Plant Breeders, 2010). Protection of intellectual property (IP) is a
subject which interests both sectors, most particularly the private sector,
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which depends upon returns from investments to encourage future cycles of
investments.
The field of IP protection as it relates to plant breeding and agricultural bio-
technology is complex, dynamic and controversial. Briefly, IP protection can
be provided in this field by trade secrets,1 contract law, utility patents and by
sui generis forms of protection such as the US Plant Patent Act of 1930 and
Plant Breeders Rights or plant variety protection (PVP) under the auspices of
the Union Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions Ve´ge´tales (UPOV).
Both PVP and the US Plant Patent Act have exceptions allowing for further
breeding and commercialisation without requiring the permission of the
owner of the initial variety (unless the new variety is predominantly or essen-
tially derived from the initial variety) in respect of PVP under UPOV’s Inter-
national Convention (UPOV, 1991). The 1930 US Patent Act applies only to
the protection of non-tuberous asexually propagated species. In 1980, the US
Supreme Court ruled that plant varieties, parts of plants and plant genes were
covered by the same utility patents that protect other US inventions. Utility
patents have no exceptions allowing for further breeding in the United States,
but may have a limited breeders’ exemption in certain countries according
to their specific patent laws. A limited breeder exception allows breeding
without the need for a licence during the life of the utility patent, but does not
allow commercialisation without the consent of the owner of the patent.
Thus, this limited exception contrasts with the farmer’s exemption and the
full breeders’ exemption allowing breeding and commercialisation which
applies to PVP prescribed by UPOV.
Plant varieties per se are not eligible to be patented in the European Union
(EU), but can be patented in the United States and in a few other countries. Spe-
cific traits, methods of breeding and products are eligible subject matter for
utility patents in the United States. The EU appears reluctant to allow native
traits to be eligible for patent protection, but will consider eligibility for
patent protection if the trait is transgenic.
Firms operating under a PVP system benefit from exclusive rights during the
introduction period, and in this sense they have exactly the same incentives as
firms operating under a patent system. But under PVP, their competitors can
access the research as soon as the variety is introduced and potentially release
the improved variety to compete with the original improvement.
The breeders’ exemption under PVP has gained increased attention among
national seed associations and policy makers because the development of
tools, such as ultra-high-throughput sequencing using molecular markers, has
allowed researchers to speed the rate at which they can create new varieties.
Utility patents generally provide 20 years of IP protection, while the length of
protection under PVP is limited to the time it takes one firm to create a distinct
new variety from germplasm introduced by the original research firm. With
1 Genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs) provide a means to protect trade secrets in the
context of plant breeding (see, e.g. Lence et al. (2005), and references therein).
2 S. H. Lence et al.
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modern sequencing, the IP protection period under PVP is reported to be in a
range of 5–7 years after the variety has been introduced.
Some in the US seed industry have been advocating for a revision of the
current PVP system to include a phase-in period for the breeders’ exemption
that is crop-specific (Donnenwirth, Grace and Smith, 2004). The logic is to
strengthen, or at least to re-assert, the original effective level of protection
under plant breeders’ rights, by extending the effective length of protection
under PVP by a time period that offsets the increased speed at which distinct
new varieties can be created.
A galvanising issue which frames the international discussion is whether new
varieties should be protected by utility patents for plant varieties or by PVP.
Pardey et al. (2013) suggest that PVP rules are weaker than utility patents due
to the breeders’ exemption and the farmer’s exemption. However, Pardey
et al. also mention that stronger PVP rules may restrain access to germplasm
and slow the pace of innovation and decrease research and development
(R&D) spillovers. This trade-off is at the heart of the present paper. If the origin-
al firm reduces overall research efforts in response to the expectation of eroded
market power due to the breeders’ exemption, the effect of the exemption on so-
cietal welfare may be negative. However, the absence of a breeders’ exemption
under utility patents will slow the adoption of inventions across research firms,
which may slow overall progress. Here, we are interested in the economic incen-
tives embedded in both systems, and the impact these incentive structures have
on the pace of change on societal welfare.
The model presented below sets up a trade-off between the benefits associated
with the rapid spread of research across firms under PVP and the incentive
problems associated with the breeders’ exemption. We analyse the outcome
of the model by comparing societal welfare under patents and PVP.
The model we introduce to compare the two systems is one where each of
several imperfectly competitive seed research firms optimises its research
programme based on the strength and length of IP protection. Every firm can
capture the benefits from its own research in the period after it was undertaken.
In subsequent periods, firms continue to conduct research, and the productivity
of this research is determined in part by the amount of research conducted in the
first period. With patents, a firm can access only its own research in subsequent
periods until the patent protection expires, whereas under PVP firms have access
to all other firms’ research. Firms anticipate this weaker level of IP when making
their research decisions. Firms arrive at a symmetric Nash equilibrium and all
conduct the same amount of research.
We choose model parameters for a baseline scenario that shows support
for each system. We then use this baseline model to evaluate a series of techno-
logical, policy and market developments, and we show how these developments
alter the balance between PVP and patents, and within both patents and PVP
systems. The list of PVP scenarios includes a base case of PVP, an alternative
case of PVP with a reduced time to develop a new variety and a PVP system
in conjunction with trade secrets. These PVP scenarios are compared with
one another and with various patent scenarios. The base-case scenario for
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patents is also compared with a scenario where patents provide a shorter length
of protection, with a trade secret, and with licensing.
The results show that patents dominate when (i) the research is time-
consuming and specific, (ii) the expected commercial life of the improved
variety is long and (iii) the research programme is path-breaking. PVP domi-
nates when (i) the type of research is straightforward and applicable across
many firms, (ii) the expected commercial life of the improved variety is short
and (iii) research programmes make incremental gains.
We provide survey data from two large seed research firms on the cost and
length of time it takes to complete different kinds of research and commercial-
isation programmes. Given the results from our model, these data suggest that
patents are more appropriate when research is needed to bring in exotic germ-
plasm and other longer-term, higher-risk research endeavours. Traditional
breeding programmes, which are also conducted by these firms, have character-
istics similar to those where PVP dominates so long as there are no trade secrets.
2. Previous work
Evenson and Gollin (1997) and Evenson (1989) show that before a new variety
can be developed and released, the plant breeding sector must make substantial
investments in R&D, which the sector can recoup by means of property rights
that allow the developer to sell the resulting seed at a price that is above marginal
production costs.
Alston and Venner (2002) propose a model in which the seed research firm
chooses its research effort based on the level of IP protection. They hypothesise
that if the US Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 strengthened IP protection,
then the US wheat sector should have experienced increased private sector in-
vestment and yields. They test this hypothesis using data on US wheat yields
and research investments and do not find any evidence in support of the hypo-
thesis. They point out that the breeders’ exemption, as well as the farmers’
right to sell and replant improved varieties without paying a royalty weakens
the degree of IP appropriability. In a later paper, Kolady and Lesser (2009) use
thesame method asAlstonand Venner (2002)and findthat privatewheatvarieties
introduced in response to PVP protections have contributed to genetic improve-
ment inwheatvarietiesgrown in WashingtonState.Naseem, Oehmkeand Schim-
melpfennig (2005) report similar results for cotton in the United States. The
positive PVP results for wheat and cotton are attributed to the availability of
some IP protection under PVP relative to the alternative of no IP protection.
Hayes, Lence and Goggi (2009) show that in the case of wheat, compared with
the United States, countries that have offered more effective property rights (e.g.
the United Kingdom and France) have experienced significant increases in
yields and greater yield growth as a result of genetic gains from plant breeding.
They argue that incentives for the private sector to conduct research on wheat
varieties in the United States have been weakened by the breeders’ exemption.
Swanson and Goeschl (2005) show that the research and yield outcomes
observed for hybrid crops, such as corn and sorghum, can be used as an indicator
4 S. H. Lence et al.
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of what might happen if IP protection were strengthened in other crops. With
hybrid crops farmers are required to purchase new seed each year, thereby cre-
ating the market conditions that attract private-sector investment. They show
that yield growth has been fastest for crops (corn and sorghum) where this
private-sector investment has been important.2 Swanson and Goeschl make
a strong case for appropriate private-sector incentives. They refer to the
problem of the durable-goods monopolist (see, also, Perrin and Fulginiti,
2008) who will eventually face competition and erosion of market power
from second-hand versions of their own goods—except that in this case the
problem is exaggerated because the goods themselves are capable of reproduc-
tion. Kolady, Spielman and Cavalieri (2012) use data from India to show that
yield trends for maize and pearl millet have outpaced those for wheat and
rice. They attribute this difference to the use of hybrid seed, with associated
IP protection, in maize and pearl millet, and the lack of IP protection in self-
pollinated wheat and rice crops.3
Lence and Hayes (2005) show that IP fees that are charged in one country and
not in the other are harmful to producers in the first country when research spill-
over between the two countries is high. This study also shows that R&D firms do
not have the incentive develop technologies that can be easily adopted in coun-
tries with low IP protection. Thus, they conclude that equalising IP appropria-
bility across countries gives R&D firms a strong incentive to conduct R&D of
relevance to both countries.
Hayes, Lence and Goggi (2009) provide data that suggest that strong IP pro-
tection, such as that provided by patents, has a positive influence on genetic
gains.
Moschini and Yerokhin (2008) develop a game-theoretic model of patents
with and without a research exemption (analogous to a breeders’ exemption
in PVP) and show that when research is risky or expensive, the system with a
research exemption will not provide sufficient incentives. They also show
that when research costs are low, patents with a research exemption may
improve on patents without it because it ensures a larger pool of research
upon which to base subsequent improvements. They also show that a system
with patents (without research exemption) and licensing weakly dominates
patents with a research exemption.
Eaton and van Tongeren (2005) develop a model to examine the impact of a
slow phase-in of the breeder’s exemption. They use a two-stage game model of
vertical product differentiation, in which two profit-maximising breeding firms
2 Alston, Gray and Bolek (2012) suggested that Australia’s use of end-point royalties for wheat
varieties, collected when the grain is delivered to the elevator, has encouraged private-sector
investment in wheat-breeding in Australia and is likely to lead to future research investment-
cum-innovation patterns in Australian wheat more like those observed for hybrid corn in the
United States.
3 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that plant breeders who do little creative breeding like to be
able to use new varieties of others to breed small variants, but they do not want to have to compete
with their own customers. So they tend to support PVP but not utility patenting.
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choose the quality and then the price of their respective seed varieties. One firm
is a quality leader and the other is a follower. Firms increase quality by spending
on research along a quadratic cost function. The phase-in scenario of the
breeders’ exemption in plant breeder’s rights is introduced by means of increas-
ing the second firm’s costs due to delayed access to the leading firm’s research.
Reduced access to the leading firm’s research leads to increased profits for the
leading firm, but decreases in varietal quality and farm profits.
Pardey et al. (2013) provide a rich data set showing applications for plant
patents in the United States increasing gradually from 1930 to 1980, and then
increasing at a very rapid rate until the present day. Their data show that appli-
cations for utility patents increased dramatically after 1990 and have outpaced
and substituted for PVP applications since then. In the period prior to the intro-
duction of PVP and utility patent protections, ornamental crops and fruits
accounted for the great bulk of applications. In the more recent data, cereals
and oilseeds (primarily corn and soybeans) account for 87 per cent of utility
patents and approximately half of the PVP applications. The large number of
PVP applications for cereals and oilseeds at a time when utility patents were
available is explained by a 2001 US Supreme Court ruling that allowed dual
protection using both PVP and utility patents.
Our results are in agreement with the discussion provided in Pardey et al.
(2013) and with the theoretical results derived in Moschini and Yerokhin
(2008). Each of the two primary IP protection systems has advantages and dis-
advantages, and neither of them is better than the other under all possible cir-
cumstances. Unlike the two earlier papers, our model has enough structure to
describe the specific parametric conditions under which one IP protection
system dominates the other. We are also able to consider subtle changes such
as licensing and changes in the effective length of IP protection and show
how these alter the results. Our results disagree with Eaton and van Tongeren
(2005) in that their paper leads to an unambiguous conclusion about welfare
and ours does not. In our model all firms are similar in terms of research
budgets whereas in the Eaton and van Tongeren model one firm dominates in
terms of research achievements. Three of our simulation results are in agree-
ment with Moschini and Yerokhin, even though their model is very different
from ours.4 Our results on the benefits of a finite patent-life mirror the key
result in Koo and Wright (2010). Their paper differentiates between ex ante
and ex post negotiations of licensing agreements and shows that a finite
patent-life is optimal when licensing is negotiated ex post.
4 InMoschini andYerokhin’smodel thereareonly twofirms who play twogames sequentially. In the
initial game (which is only played once), they invest in R&D until one of them succeeds at obtaining
an innovation. The nature of the second game depends on whether there is a research exemption
or not. If there is no exemption, the loser of the first game quits, and the successful innovator
becomes a monopolist. If there is an exemption, the two firms play an improvement game, in
which the innovation resulting from the first game reduces the cost of obtaining additional
improvements.
6 S. H. Lence et al.
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3. Amodelofgenetic improvementsbyprivateR&Dfirms
The impact of the existing IP protection regime on the rate of genetic improve-
ment achieved by private R&D firms is assessed by means of a non-stochastic
infinite-horizon dynamic model consisting of N private R&D firms.5 The
model is ambitious, but a number of simplifying assumptions are made to be
able to obtain numerical solutions. First, the model assumes a single country
with no trade, an exogenously given number of R&D firms (N), no randomness
(e.g. in the production of genetic improvements from research) and no simultan-
eous availability of different types of IP protection.6 Second, all R&D firms
are identical, which allows us to focus on the numerical solution consisting
of the steady-state symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium associated
with each IP regime.7 In addition, genetic research is assumed to yield a
‘generic’ improvement, thus ignoring different types of genetic improvements
(e.g., horizontally versus vertically differentiated).
The timing of the decisions and outcomes involving thenth R&D firm are out-
lined in Figure 1. In the first period in Figure 1, research is conducted. In the
second period, the firm has exclusive commercialisation rights, either
because competitors have not yet adapted the variety or because they are prohib-
ited from doing so. In the third period, firms operating under PVP are faced with
competition from other firms who have adapted the variety. Competition does
not occur with patents or with trade secrets.
Fig. 1. Timing framework of decisions and outcomes for the nth R&D firm.
5 Aspointedoutbyan anonymous reviewer, in the United States there tends tobemorepatents than
PVP when the private sector dominates a crop segment (Kolady and Lesser, 2009), which suggests
that the developer of the technology is an important factor in deciding the type of protection. Our
model does not account for this issue because it focuses only on the incentives of private firms
whose goal is to maximise profits.
6 Since the type of IP protection regime is given, we cannot address the central question of whether
firms choose one type of IP regime over another.
7 This set of assumptions is perhaps the most critical one to obtain a workable model, because one
only needs to solve for the optimal action of one firm given that in equilibrium all other firms take
the same action. Note that the research outcomes from different firms are different from an agro-
nomic standpoint, butyield the same level ofeconomic benefits (in the sameway that twodifferent
assets may yield the same return).
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At time t, the nth R&D firm chooses the amount of genetic research xn,t.
Such research takes time and results in a genetic improvement of fn,t+1 =
f(xn,t) (∂f(·)/∂xn,t . 0, ∂2f(·)/∂x2n,t ≤ 0) that can be marketed after one
period. In the model, one unit of time is defined as the amount of time it takes
to obtain a genetic improvement (and bring it to market). The survey data
shown later suggest that in the case of traditional breeding this period is from
3 to 7 years. The postulated transformation of research into genetic improve-
ment also implies that it is always possible to obtain improvements regardless
of the level of genetic stocks. Therefore, there are no secular trends towards
yield plateaus or the like.
Genetic research xn,t involves a cost of c(xn,t, Qn,t), which is increasing at an
increasing rate with the amount of research (∂c(·)/∂xn,t . 0, ∂2c(·)/∂x2n,t . 0),
and decreasing at a decreasing rate with the amount of genetic stock available to
the nth firm (∂c(·)/∂Qn,t , 0, ∂2c(·)/∂Q2n,t . 0). To ensure an interior solution
to the nth firm’s optimisation problem, it is also assumed that the cost of per-
forming research for xn,t. 0 is strictly positive, regardless of how large avail-
able genetic stocks are (i.e. c(xn,t. 0, Qn,t 1) . 0).
The genetic stock that is available to firm n and allows it to reduce the cost of
genetic improvements (Qn,t) consists of the stock of firm n’s own past improve-
ments (Fn,t), plus the stocks of all other firms’ improvements that are available to
firm n (rtFn,t2t) not overlapping with Fn,t
Qn,t = Fn,t + vrtF−n,t−t, (1)
where subscript n denotes all firms other than firm n. Parameter v[ [0, 1]
reflects the extent to which the other firms’ genetic stocks that are available to
firm n can be effectively used by the latter to reduce the cost of its own improve-
ments. At one extreme, v ¼ 0 means that other firms’ genetic stocks are of no
use to firm n, whereas the other polar case of v ¼ 1 represents the situation
where other firms’ genetic stocks are fully exploited by firm n. Parameter r[
[0, 1] denotes the survival rate of the genetic stocks; that is, genetic stocks
decay at the rate of (1 2 r) per unit of time. In this model, decay occurs
because of, for example, co-evolving pests and diseases.8
According to Equation (1), the genetic stocks of other firms are made avail-
able to firm n to reduce the cost of its genetic improvements with a lag of t [
{0, 1, 2, . . .} periods. The case of t ¼ 0 yields Qn,t ¼ Fn,t + vFn,t and is
meant to represent the scenario of PVP, where the plant breeder’s exemption
allows firm n to access other firms’ stocks as soon as they are brought to
market, so that it can incorporate them into its own R&D programme.
The other polar situation of t ¼1 would be exemplified by a trade secret, in
which case Equation (1) simplifies to Qn,t ¼ Fn,t. In this instance, firm n can
only use the past outcomes of its own research programme to reduce the cost
8 ‘Cumulative’ improvements are not ruled out, but they are assumed to be outweighed by decay.
Otherwise, it would be meaningless to attempt to obtain a steady-state solution to the model,
because stocks would grow without bound.
8 S. H. Lence et al.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/erae/article-abstract/43/1/1/2367179
by Iowa State University user
on 05 December 2017
of further improvements, as it is prevented forever from accessing the genetic
stocks developed by its competitors.
The evolution of the genetic stock produced by firm n is represented by
Fn,t = rFn,t−1 + fn,t. (2)
That is, the genetic stock produced by firm n decays at the rate (1 2 r) [ [0, 1]
per unit of time, but is augmented by firm n’s genetic improvement (fn,t ¼
f(xn,t21)), which is the outcome of the research conducted in the previous
period.
Genetic improvement fn,t (¼f(xn,t21)) yields net revenues to firm n over
T + 1 ≥ 1 periods. Over the period when improvement fn,t is introduced,
firm n receives net revenues represented by the function b(fn,t; fn,t), which
is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate in the nth firm’s own genetic im-
provement (∂b(·)/∂fn,t . 0, ∂2b(·)/∂f2n,t , 0). Firm n’s net revenues are also
assumed to be negatively affected by the genetic improvements achieved by
its competitors, such that ∂b(.)/∂fn,t, 0. Because of the decay in the genetic
stock, firm n’s net revenues from improvement fn,t are lower for period t + j
(j ¼ 1, . . . , T + 1), and described as b(rjfn,t; rjfn,t).
With the aforementioned model structure, and assuming that the other firms’
genetic stocks (Fn,t– max(T,t)) and the sequences of genetic improvements (fn,t,
fn,t21, . . . ,fn,t– max(T,t)) are known to firm n, the optimisation problem for firm
n at period t consists of
n(fn,t,fn,t−1, . . . ,fn,t−T ,Fn,t;f−n,t,f−n,t−1, . . . ,f−n,t−max(T,t),F−n,t−t)
= max
xn,t≥0
∑T
j=0
b(fn,t−j;f−n,t−j) − c(xn,t,Fn,t + vrtF−n,t−t)
{
+dn[f(xn,t),fn,t, . . . ,fn,t−T+1, rFn,t + f(xn,t); f−n,t+1,f−n,t, . . . ,
f−n,t−max(T,t)+1, rF−n,t−t + f−n,t−t+1]}, (3)
where d [ [0, 1] is the discount rate. The solution to Equation (3) yields the
optimal amount of genetic research firm n should undertake at time
t, x∗n, t ; x
∗(fn, t, . . . ,fn, t−T ,Fn, t;f−n, t, . . . ,f−n, t−max(T,t),F−n, t−t), as a func-
tion of its own record of genetic improvements (fn, t, . . . , fn, t–T, Fn, t) and
the record of its rivals (fn, t, . . . ,fn, t– max(T,t),Fn, t–t). In the scenarios discussed
later such implicit function cannot be expressed analytically; hence, it is
obtained by computational methods.
The notation in optimisation (Equation (3)) is relatively involved because of
the complexities the model aims to capture. However, Equation (3) has the
canonical structure of the Bellman equation for infinite-horizon continuous-
state dynamic optimisation problems under certainty (see, for example,
Miranda and Fackler, 2002: 190–191), namely,
n(s) = maxx{ f (x, s) + dn[g(x, s)]}, (4)
Intellectual property protection in plant breeding 9
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where v(.) is the value function (i.e. the maximum sum of current and future
rewards), the vectorof state variables s; [s1 . . . sS] represents thestate of theeco-
nomic system known by the decision maker when taking action x, function f(x, s)
is the decision maker’s instantaneous reward from taking action x in state s, and
the vector of transition functions g(x, s); [g1(x, s) . . . gS(x, s)] determines the
state at time t + 1, given the state at time t and the action taken by the agent
at time t (i.e. if xt and st denote the action and state corresponding to time t,
then sj,t+1 ¼ gj(xt, st) for j ¼ 1, . . . , S). From the comparison of Equations
(3) and (4), it is straightforward to conclude that the former is a special case
of the latter.9 By having our model conform to the canonical Bellman equation
(Equation (4)), we are able to apply standard techniques to obtain a solution.
Model (3) is a dynamic game because each rival firmfaces a problem analogous
to the one faced by firmn, and its solution requiressimultaneouslysolving for all of
theNfirms’ optimal genetic improvements. Numerical methods to solve dynamic
games are discussed in Miranda and Fackler (2002, Chapters 8 and 9). We assume
that all firms are identical and solve numerically for the steady-state symmetric
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium associated with alternative policy regimes. That
is, defining Vi[ V as the specific underlying functional forms and parameters
of the model meant to represent the ith policy regime, we compute the scalar
xi ; x∗n,t(Vi) denoting the optimal genetic research for firm n at time t under
policy i. Scalar xi is the same for all firms and times because firms are identical,
the model involves an infinite horizon and there is no uncertainty.
3.1. Welfare measures
The proposed model is used to analyse the implications of different policies
towards R&D on genetic improvements and welfare. The model is simulated
to compute the following measures associated with a change from policy
regime i to policy regime j,
DXji ; Njxj − Nixi, (5)
DVji ; Nj(1 − d)v[·|fn,t = f (xj) ∀ n, t]
− Ni(1 − d)v[·|fn,t = f(xi) ∀ n, t], (6)
DUji ; U[·|fn,t = f (xj) ∀ n, t] − U[·|fn,t = f (xi) ∀ n, t]. (7)
9 To see this point, let the vector st in Equation (4) consists of the following [T + max(T, t) + 4] state
variables: sj,t¼ fn,t2j+1 for j ¼ 1, . . . , T + 1; sT+2,t ¼ Fn,t; sj+T+2,t¼ fn,t2j+1 for j ¼ 1, . . . , max(T, t) + 1
andsT+max(T,t)+4,t ¼ Fn,t2t.Withsuchdefinitions, it isclear thatEquation (3)’s reward function is the
sum of benefits minus the cost (i.e. f (xt , st ) = ST+1j=1 b(s j,t ; sj+T+2, t ) − c(xt , sT +2, t + vrts2T+4, t )).
Finally, it can be inferred from Equation (4) that the model’s [T + max(T, t) + 4] transition functions
are the arguments of Equation (3)’s last term. More specifically, given the aforementioned state
variables, and since sj,t+1 ¼ gj(x, st) by definition of the jth transition function, the discussion lead-
ing to Equation (3) implies the following expressions for the transition functions: s1,t+1 ¼ fn,t+1 ¼
f(xn,t) ¼ g1(x, st); sj,t+1 ¼ fn,t2j+2 ¼ sj+1,t ¼ gj(x, st) for j ¼ 2, . . . , T + 1; sT+2,t+1 ¼ Fn,t+1 ¼ rFn,t +
fn,t+1 ¼ r sT+2,t + f(xn,t) ¼ gT+2(x, st); sj+T+2,t+1 ¼ fn,t2j+2 ¼ sj+T+3,t ¼ gj+T+2(x, st) for j ¼ 1, . . . ,
max(T, t) + 1; and sT+max(T,t)+4,t+1 ¼ Fn,t2t+1 ¼ rFn,t2t + fn,t2t+1 ¼ r sT+max(T,t)+4,t + sT+t+3,t ¼
gT+max(T,t)+4(x, st).
10 S. H. Lence et al.
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whereU(.) denotes the function measuring per-period net benefits from genetic
improvements to society, excluding benefits to R&D firms. VariableDXji quan-
tifies the additional aggregate genetic improvement under regime j compared
with regime i. Variable DVji shows the additional per-period net profits of the
R&D firms under regime j compared with regime i. Finally, DUji measures the
additional per-period net benefits to society (except for R&D firms) under
regime j compared with regime i.10 The per-period net benefits to all of
society can be calculated as the sum of benefits to R&D firms and others in
society (i.e. DVji + DUji).
4. Simulation specification and parameterisation
To obtain numerical solutions for the proposed model, it is necessary to postu-
late specific forms for the function reflecting the transformation of genetic re-
search into genetic improvements (fn,t ¼ f(xn,t21), the net revenue function
(b(fn,t; fn,t)), and the function representing the cost of performing genetic re-
search (c(xn,t, Qn,t)). Quantifying societal welfare also requires the specification
of a functional form for society’s utility U(.). In addition, parameters must be set
at values reflecting the scenarios of interest. These issues are discussed in the
next subsections, starting with the specification of the societal benefit functionU(.).
4.1. Societal welfare
We postulate that benefits to society at time t from genetic improvements are
measured by the utility derived by a representative consumer from the genetic
improvements achieved by the different R&D firms. The specific functional
of such utility is
U(fn,t−j; n = 1, . . . ,N; j = 0, 1, 2, . . .) =
1
1 − 1/1
∑1
j=0
(rjfˆ t−j)
1−1/1
, (8)
where
fˆt−j ;
1
N
∑N
n=1
f(s−1)/st−j,n
[ ]s/(s−1)
(9)
is an index of the aggregate amount of genetic improvements achieved at time
(t2 j), s. 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the contemporaneous
10 Equations (5) and (6) imply that the number of firms differs between policy regimes if Ni= Nj.
However, as noted earlier, for tractability reasons the number of R&D firms in a particular regime
is taken to be exogenous. This assumption may be less realistic than desired, and prevents us from
exploring whether some IP protection regimes are more conducive to a larger number of R&D
competitors than others.
Intellectual property protection in plant breeding 11
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/erae/article-abstract/43/1/1/2367179
by Iowa State University user
on 05 December 2017
genetic improvements obtained by any two different firms, and 1 . 1 is a para-
meter that can be interpreted as the absolute value of the own-price elasticity
of demand for (the index of) each period’s genetic improvements.11,12
The choice of function (8) to measure welfare deserves further attention. As
noted earlier, adopting specific functional forms is unavoidable, because the nu-
merical analysis cannot proceed otherwise. Therefore, the chosen functional
forms should be sufficiently flexible to allow one to represent critical real-world
features and derive results driven by such features rather than the arbitrariness of
the adopted function. However, the chosen form also needs to be parsimonious
enough to enable parameterisation based on the literature or economic reason-
ing, and tractable to render the numerical problem solvable.
The advocated utility (8) meets the aforementioned conditions. First,
utility (8) increases with current and past aggregate genetic improvements
(∂U(·)/∂fˆt−j = r j(1−1/1) fˆ−1/1t−j . 0), but it does so at a decreasing rate
(∂2U(·)/∂fˆ 2t−j = −1−1r j(1−1/1)fˆ−(1+1/1)t−j , 0). Second, the benefits from a
specific vintage’s aggregate genetic improvement decay over time at the
rate (12 r121/1), which is determined by the rate of decay of genetic stocks
(12 r).13 Third, the aggregate genetic improvement index (Equation (9))
implies a constant elasticity of substitution s between the benefits from the
improvements obtained by any two firms. Thus, situations where improve-
ments of different firms tend to overlap can be modelled in a parsimonious
manner, by setting appropriate values for parameter s. Fourth, the im-
provements of different firms enter symmetrically into the aggregate index
(Equation (9)), which is reasonable given the assumption that all firms are
identical.14 Fifth, the utility function (Equation (8)) involves parameters
with intuitive economic interpretation, and whose values are relatively easy
to set based on the literature. Finally, utility (8) yields a functional form repre-
senting firm n’s net revenues featuring desirable properties for the simulation
exercise, as elaborated in the next subsection.
11 1. 1 is required for societal utility to be finite in the stationary state because r[ [0, 1). Letting
1 , 1 yields r121/1. 1, which means that rj(121/1) 1 as j1.
12 Suppose society can be characterised by a representative consumer with the quasilinear
utility function U(z, fˆt , fˆt−1, fˆt−2, . . .) ; z + [S1j=0(rj fˆt−j )1−1/1]/(1 − 1/1) subject to the budget
constraint W = z + S1j=0Pt−j fˆt−j , where z denotes a numeraire composite good (i.e. its price
equals one), W is the consumer’s wealth and Pt2j is the price of fˆt−j . Solving the budget
constraint for z and plugging the resulting expression into the utility function to get U(W−
S1j=0Pt−j fˆt−j , fˆt , fˆt−1, fˆt−2, . . .) = W − S1j=0Pt−j fˆt−j + [S1j=0(rj fˆt−j )1−1/1](1 − 1/1), the first-order
necessary condition (FOC) corresponding to the optimal consumption of date-(t 2 j) aggre-
gate genetic improvements is ∂U∗/∂fˆt−j = r j(1−1/1)fˆ
∗−1/1
t−j − Pt−j = 0. This means that
1 = −(Pt−j/fˆ ∗t−j )(∂fˆ ∗t−j/∂Pt−j ), as claimed.
13 Note that a genetic improvement of f achieved at time t contributes by f121/1/(1 2 1/1) units to
time-t utility, but by only (rjf)121/1/(1 2 1/1) units to utility at time (t + j). Benefits decay over
time at the rate (12 r121/1) rather than (12 r) because benefits increase with genetic improve-
ments at a decreasing rate.
14 It is very difficult to justify asymmetric benefits from the improvements of different firms when
firms are identical. If benefits are symmetric, utility will be a function of some aggregate index
of improvements across firms, as assumed in Equations (8) and (9).
12 S. H. Lence et al.
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4.2. R&D firms’ net revenues
The analysis in footnote 12 also implies that FOC ∂U*/∂fn,t can be used to
derive the inverse demand for genetic improvement fn,t2j. Letting Pn,t2j
denote the price of fn,t2j, the expression for such inverse demand is
Pn,t−j = 1
N
r j(1−1/1) fˆ 1/s−1/1t−j f
−1/s
n,t−j . (10)
Given Equation (10), the function representing firm n’s net revenues at time t,
from the genetic improvements it obtained at time (t2 j), consists of
b(fn,t−j;f−n,t−j) = mIP,t−jPn,t−jfn,t−j,
= mIP,t−j
1
N
r j(1−1/1)fˆ 1/s−1/1t−j f
1−1/s
n,t−j .
(11)
In expression (11), parametermIP,t2j[ [0, 1] denotes the share of the time-t net
revenues from the genetic improvement achieved by R&D firm n at time (t2 j)
that are actually captured by firm n.
ParametermIP,t2j is strongly influenced by the extent to which IP is protected.
For example,mIP,t2j ¼ 1 for j ¼ 0, . . . , pwhen there is statutory protection over
p ≥ 1 periods (i.e. IP is fully protected for p periods). Parameter mIP,t2j ¼ 0 ∀
j. p if there is a large number of competitors preventing firm n from exerting
any market power over its own genetic improvements after the statutory protec-
tion period.15 The expression for net revenues reported in Figure 1 implies
mIP,t2j ¼ 0 ∀ j. T.
4.3. Cost of genetic research
The functional form for the cost of genetic research used for the reported simu-
lations consists of
c(xn,t,Qn,t) =
xan,t
2
[1 + exp(−gQn,t)], (12)
where a ≥ 1 is the elasticity of research costs with respect to genetic research,
and g ≥ 0 captures the effect of the genetic stocks available to firm n(Qn,t) on its
research costs. The elasticity of research costs with respect to genetic research
also represents the degree of convexity of research costs as a function of genetic
research. The results reported here were obtained by setting the cost elasticity
equal to a ¼ 2, but simulations were also performed for other values of a.
The choice of specification (12) was guided by the theoretical assump-
tions (i.e. the requirements that ∂c(·)/∂xn,t . 0, ∂2c(·)/∂x2n,t . 0, ∂c(·)/
∂Qn,t , 0, ∂
2c(·) /∂Q2n,t . 0, and c(xn,t . 0,Qn,t  1) . 0), parsimony,
15 Note that genetic improvements may become obsolete so soon after they are obtained that the
effective protection period may be shorter than the statutory protection period. In the present
model, such situation would be represented by a sufficiently high rate of decay of genetic stocks
(12 r).
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ease of calibration and interpretation, and numerical tractability. Simulations
were also performed for generalisations of function (12), and for alterna-
tive cost functions satisfying the key theoretical assumptions.16 They are
omitted to preserve space, as they yielded the same qualitative results as
specification (12).
According to function (12), research costs are highest when available genetic
stocks are zero (c(xn,t, Qn,t = 0) = xan,t), and lowest when stocks are very large
(c(xn,t, Qn,t  1) = 0.5 xan,t). In other words, the genetic stocks available to
firm n have the potential to reduce its research costs by as much as half.
Ceteris paribus, the larger the value of parameter g, the lower are research
costs. To appreciate the relationship between g and research costs, re-write
expression (12) as
c(xn,t, Qn,t) = c(xn,t, Qn,t = 0) (1 − ∇ ), (13)
where∇ ; 0.5 [12 exp(2gQn,t)][ [0, 0.5] is the proportional reduction in
research costs when genetic stocks rise from zero to Qn,t. Since g ¼ 2ln(12
2∇ )/Qn,t, g increases monotonically with the proportional reduction in costs
due to any given stock increase from zero. Alternatively, note that the semi-
elasticity of research costs with respect to genetic stocks is given by
1
c(xn,t,Qn,t)
∂c(xn,t,Qn,t)
∂Qn,t
= −g[1 + exp(gQn,t)]−1. (14)
Thus, parameter g is equal to (minus) twice the semi-elasticity of research
costs with respect to genetic stocks evaluated at zero stocks (Qn,t ¼ 0).
4.4. Transformation of genetic research into genetic improvements
The structure of the canonical Bellman equation (Equation (4)) is such that
the value function remains unchanged if the decision variable is defined to
be a concave and strictly increasing monotonic transformation of variable x
(i.e. z; h(x) satisfying h′(.). 0 and h′′(.), 0). This assertion holds true as
long as the reward function and the transition function vector are correspondingly
modified to F(z, s) ; f[h21(z), s] and G(z, s) ; g(x, s), where h21(.) is the
inverse of functionh(.). Because of this result, for simplicity we set the transition
function representing the transformation of genetic research into genetic
improvements (fn,t ¼ f(xn,t21)) equal to fn,t ¼ xn,t21.17 In other words, the
adopted transition function implies that one unit of genetic research yields
one unit of genetic improvement.
16 For example, we run simulations using c(x, Q)¼ (g1x + 0.5g2xa) [1 + g3exp(2g0Q)]) and c(x, Q) ¼
(g1x + 0.5g2xa) [1 + g3/(1 + g0Q)].
17 To illustrate that the specific choice of the transition function f(·) is inconsequential (provided
it meets the stated conditions), note that we would obtain identical results as reported later
if instead of letting fn,t ¼ xn,t21 and c(x, Q) be given by Equation (12), we had set
fn, t = xan, t and c(x ,Q) = 0.5(xan, t )2[1 + exp(−gQn, t )] for a [ (0, 1).
14 S. H. Lence et al.
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4.5. Parameterisation and specific scenarios
As noted in the previous section, the model is such that one period is defined as
the amount of time it takes to obtain a genetic improvement (and bring it to
market). To make the model representative of real-world experience, each
period is assumed to last 5 years. The simulations are performed by setting
the discount factor d ¼ 0.8587 (¼0.975), which implies an interest rate of
3 per cent per year. We let the cost parameter g and the rate of depreciation of
the genetic stocks take values over the ranges g [ [0, 8] and (12 r) [ [0.2,
1]. For the base simulations, parameters N and v are fixed at N ¼ 4 and
v ¼ 0.5. This assumption means that the genetic R&D industry consists of
four identical firms, and that each firm can effectively use only 50 per cent of
its competitors’ available genetic stocks to reduce the cost of its own improve-
ments. In addition, for the base simulations the elasticity of demand (1), the elas-
ticity of substitution (s) and the revenue share parameter (mIP,t2j) are,
respectively, set equal to 1 ¼ 1.5, s ¼ 2 and mIP,t2j ¼ 1 for j ¼ 0, . . . , T.18
Obtaining numerical solutions for the model can be challenging, even after
simplifying the problemby assuming identical firmsand solving only for the sta-
tionary pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium values. In particular, if either
the genetic improvement yields net revenues to its developer over many periods
(but less than infinity), or competitors’ genetic stocks are available to a firm only
after many periods (but less than infinity), the problem is numerically intract-
able. If either T or t is large (but T,1 or t,1, respectively), the value func-
tion (Equation (3)) depends on a large number of state variables, in which case
the problem suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Therefore, simulations are
performed for a selected number of (T, t) combinations meant to represent the
main scenarios of interest.
The parameterisations used for the reported scenarios are summarised in
Table 1. The parameterisation (T ¼ 0, t ¼ 0, v ¼ 0.5, time unit ¼ 5 years) is
taken to be most representative of PVP and is used as the base case of PVP. In
this scenario, firms can exclusively exploit the genetic improvement over a rela-
tively short period (i.e. during the period t in Figure 1, or 5 years under the
parameterisation being used). This scenario corresponds to T ¼ 0. The plant
breeder’s exemption allows firms to use their competitors’ improvements to
conduct research to enhance their own genetic improvements immediately
(t ¼ 0), and to commercialise these improvements during period t + 1. But
firms do not possess enough knowledge about their competitors’ stocks to
exploit them to their full extent (v ¼ 0.5).
An alternative case of PVP is simulated by also setting (T ¼ 0, t ¼ 0, v ¼
0.5), but fixing the period lengths at 2.5 years (instead of 5 years in the base
PVP). This scenario, labelled ‘short PVP’, is analysed to investigate the
impact of reducing the amount of time to improve genetic stocks and the
18 Our simulations represent PVP without farmers’ rights. The farmers’ rights provision of PVP
weakens IP protection, thus implying mIP,t2j , 1 for j ¼ 0, . . . , p. Because of space constraints, we
only report results for mIP,t2j ¼ 1 for j ¼ 0, . . . , p, which in the case of PVP can be interpreted as
no farmers’ rights.
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commercial life of genetic improvements. The short PVP is analogous to the
base PVP, but with periods that last half as long. Hence, to be consistent with
an annual interest rate of 3 per cent, the short-PVP discount factor is set equal
to d ¼ 0.9267 (¼0.972.5). Similarly, when comparing the base PVP with the
short PVP, the per-period rate of decay of the genetic improvements, the
amount of genetic improvements per period and the flow of benefits per
period are adjusted so as to be consistent with each other when measured in
years.
The base case of patents is represented by the scenario characterised by
(T ¼ 1, t ¼ 2, v ¼ 0.5). In this instance, firms are able to commercially
exploit the genetic improvement over a longer interval (t ¼ 1), and they
cannot use their competitors’ improvements to enhance their own genetic
improvements before patents expire (t ¼ 2). As with PVP, under a patent
regime a firm’s genetic stock may overlap with the stocks of its competitors
(v ¼ 0.5). To explore the effect of modifying the life of patents, a short-patent
scenario is also simulated by cutting the base-case patent-life in half (i.e. by
setting T ¼ 0 and t ¼ 1, while maintaining v ¼ 0.5).
Importantly, the strength of IP protection also depends on the type of repro-
duction. Other things equal, hybrids enjoy stronger IP protection than self-
pollinated varieties (Lence et al., 2005; Swanson and Goeschl, 2005; Kolady,
Spielman and Cavalieri, 2012). Lence et al. (2005: 952) also note that
. . . hybrids are difficult to copy for a farmer reseeding harvested seed, but a
hybrid that has similar agronomic attributes to a protected variety (a look-
alike) can be created by breeding—especially where IPP rights allow for
access by breeders (e.g. under PVP) and where breeders make use of new
technologies to target genes and/or cut generation time from, e.g., ten
Table 1. Summary of parameterisations corresponding to reported simulation scenarios
Scenario
Time
unit
(years)
Number of periods
over which a genetic
improvement
provides net revenues
to its developer
(T + 1[ {1, 2, . . .})
Number of
periods until a
firm can
use competitors’
genetic stocks
(t [ {0, 1, 2, . . .})
Extent to which a
firm can effectively
use available
competitors’ genetic
stocks (v[ [0, 1])
PVP 5 1 (⇒ T ¼ 0) 0 0.5
Short PVP 2.5 1 (⇒ T ¼ 0) 0 0.5
Patents 5 2 (⇒ T ¼ 1) 2 0.5
Short patents 5 1 (⇒ T ¼ 0) 1 0.5
Trade secrets 5 2 (⇒ T ¼ 1) 1 Irrelevant
Licensing 5 2 (⇒ T ¼ 1) 0 1
Note: All of the reported simulations assume that the genetic R&D industry consists of four identical firms (N ¼ 4), a
discount factor implying an interest rate of 3 per cent per year (d ¼ 0.97), a demand elasticity of 1.5 (1 ¼ 1.5),
an elasticity of substitution equal to two (s ¼ 2), an elasticity of research costs with respect to genetic research equal
to two (a ¼ 2) and a revenue share parameter equal to one (mIP,t2j ¼ 1 for j ¼ 0, . . . , T).
16 S. H. Lence et al.
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years to four years. In these circumstances, a look-alike can be on the market
five years after the protected variety was commercialized (and while the
initial hybrid still would have had fifteen years of its protected life left
under a utility patent).
Therefore, the framework proposed here can also be used to investigate the cases
of hybrids with or without patents. More specifically, hybrids with (without)
patents are essentially the same as the scenario with (short) patents.
In the presence of trade secrets, firms are unable to use their competitors’
genetic improvements to develop their own genetic improvements as long as
they are kept secret. We model the base case for trade secrets by setting T ¼ 1
and t ¼1. Results from this set of simulations are independent of parameter
v, as expression (1) implies that t ¼1 renders v irrelevant.
Finally, the impact of licensing is modelled by fixing (T ¼ 1, v ¼ 1), and
reducing t from t ¼ 2 to t ¼ 0. That is, this set of simulations assumes that
firms receive revenues from their genetic improvements over two periods
(T ¼ 1) and that competitors’ improvements can be exploited to their full
extent when available (v ¼ 1). Thus, reducing t from t ¼ 2 to t ¼ 0 implies
that competitors’ genetic improvements can be used immediately to reduce a
firm’s improvement costs, rather than having to wait for two periods to do so.19
5. Survey results
The results that are to follow are sensitive to two key parameters. The first is
parameter g, which measures the degree to which previous genetic research
reduces the cost of, or leverages, obtaining genetic improvements in a particular
period. Projects that require a high degree of prior research will have a high
value for g. Intuitively, g is a measure of the degree of research complexity.
The second key parameter is (1 2 r), the rate at which genetic improvements
depreciate. The rate of depreciation of genetic improvements is a standard
measure, but the research complexity term g is specific to the present paper.
In order to better understand the size of g across different improvements, we
asked two of the largest seed research firms to rank various genetic improve-
ments with respect to their interpretation of this parameter. Because the scien-
tists were not familiar with the method used to deriveg, the way we chose to ask
them about research complexity was for them to describe each type of improve-
ment as a proportion of the time and cost involved in incorporating exotic
19 To motivate this approach to the modelling of licensing, suppose that by charging a licence fee of
ln,t to firm j= n at period t, firm n allows firm j to access its genetic improvementfn,t for research
purposes over periods t through (t + t). Similarly, suppose firmn can access firm j’s (j= n) genetic
improvement fj,t for research purposes over periods t through (t + t) by paying firm j the licence
fee lj,t at period t. In a stationary pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium, ln,t = l for all firms n
and all periods t. Therefore, for an individual firm n the revenues from selling licences to the other
firms in any single period are equal to (N − 1)land are exactly offset by the aggregate amount paid
by firmn to eachof the other firms to obtain their licences. The direct revenuesand costs stemming
from the licences exactly cancel each other; however, licensing also reduces the cost of obtaining
improvements for each firm from c(xn,t, Fn,t + vrtFn,t2t) to c(xn,t, Fn,t + Fn,t).
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germplasm into maize. This proportional measure was chosen so as to protect
business confidential information and because the incorporation of exotic germ-
plasm was the most complex programme currently ongoing at both of the com-
panies. The transition from research complexity to the time and cost index is
intuitive. When a company funds a research project that is expected to take
15 years, it may do so with an expectation that applicable results will become
available sometime within the last 5 years, whereas a project that has a life
expectancy of only 5 or 10 years must begin to pay off sooner. Projects that
take 15 years to develop will typically have a long expected commercial life
compared with projects that take only 5 years. If this were not the case then
the firm would not undertake the multiyear investment.
The survey results are shown in Table 2. The link between the survey results
andg is far from perfect. Nevertheless, the results suggest that single-gene back-
crossing and traditional breeding programmes are those with a low value of g.
Second-generation transgenes and the introduction of exotic germplasm have
much greater complexity or g. An IP protection system that favours high g
research is therefore likely to favour second-generation transgenes and the
incorporation of exotic germplasm.
6. Simulation results
In Figure 2, panels A and B compare genetic improvement under PVP (panel A)
and patents (panel B). Both methods of IP protection lead to a maximum genetic
improvement when research is complex and the expected shelf life of the tech-
nology is long. Both exhibit reduced genetic improvement when research is less
complex. The intuition here is that when research is complex there is little
Table 2. Time to product commercialisation for different types of genetic improvements
Genetic improvement
Index time to product
commercialisationa
Pioneer
corn
Pioneer
soybeans Monsanto
Single-gene backcrossed into elite material 0.200 0.300 0.378
Single-gene backcrossed into elite recurrent parent.
Example would be converting line to glyphosate
resistance
0.300
Common breeding programme Elite × Elite 0.350 0.400
Germplasm enhancement Exotic × Elite 0.700 0.600
Develop second-generation transgenes + regulatory 0.778
No public programme. Company works through
un-adapted germplasm to identify trait of interest
Exotic × Exotic
1.000 1.000 1.000
aThe index measures time to commercialisation relative to time to develop the improvement.
18 S. H. Lence et al.
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incentive to develop long-run research programmes, because these programmes
do not deliver cost savings in subsequent periods. Differences between the two
systems will be described below.
In Figure 3, panel A compares the genetic improvement for PVP and patents
and represents the difference between the two welfare measures in three dimen-
sions. Panel B is a two-dimensional projection of this difference. The vertical
axis in panel A of Figure 3 is the genetic improvement under a patent minus
the genetic improvement under PVP. A positive value suggests that patents
dominate and a negative value is supportive of PVP.
The blue line that starts at the right-hand corner of Figure 3, panel B and
extends to the left and then turns to the right is an iso-line showing the combina-
tions of parameters where patents and PVP provide the same genetic improve-
ment. Points to the left of this iso-line favour patents and points to the right
favour PVP. Note that we can choose the cut-off points for parameters g and
(12 r) to favour either system; therefore, this difference should be viewed as
an ordinal and not a cardinal measure.
Fig. 2. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under PVP and patents. (A) PVP and
(B) patents.
Fig. 3. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents minus aggregate
equilibrium genetic improvement under PVP. (A) Three-dimensional representation and
(B) two-dimensional representation.
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Starting from the bottom right-hand corner of panel B in Figure 3, with a 100
per cent depreciation rate, the new variety is fully depreciated by the end of the
period when it is introduced. In this area, the protection provided by the patent in
periods after its introduction is not relevant. Therefore, firms operating under a
patent system have no incentive to perform any research other than to obtain
commercial benefits during the introduction period. Under PVP, competitor
firms can access the research as soon as it is introduced and release these var-
ieties in the following period. As the latter improved varieties are sold,
genetic improvements in subsequent periods will be larger than under a
patent. In the extreme case represented by the bottom right-hand corner of
panel B in Figure 3, the degree to which competitors can gain from research con-
ducted by other firms is zero because g is zero. In this instance, both systems
provide the same genetic improvement and the same amount of social welfare.
Staying with a 100 per cent depreciation rate (12 r ¼ 1), the PVP system
begins to dominate as g grows. The dominance of PVP in this region reflects
the research and commercial development that is conducted by competitors
immediately after a variety’s introduction, as is legal under PVP but illegal
underpatents (unless licensedbythepatentowner).20 PVPallows these short-lived
commercial varieties to yield the maximum genetic improvement and social
welfare by ensuring that these varieties reach as many breeders as possible,
even before the protection on these varieties expires. PVP dominates patents
for all values of g along this vertical line.
Now shift the vertical comparison line slightly to the left to 12 r ¼ 0.98, so
that the improved variety has some useful life after the period when it is intro-
duced. Here the incentive system afforded by patents starts to assert itself.
Firms recognise the benefits of having exclusive commercial benefits after
the introduction period, and they ramp up research programmes in response.
Patents dominate both when g is small and when it is large. At small values of
g the diffusion process is not important because there is little value in other
firms’ research, and at large values of g diffusion has reached its upper limit
because of diminishing marginal returns built into the research production
function.
Moving towards the left of this panel to 12 r ¼ 0.5 where varieties have
longer shelf lives, patents dominate regardless of the value of g. Here, the
strong incentives provided by long-lived varieties and long-lived protection
dominate the diffusion advantages of the PVP system. Note also that the
greater is the size of g, the greater is the advantage of patents. Firms have
greater incentive to fund highly complex (cumulative), long-term research pro-
grammes when the research product is of long-lasting value and they know that
they can exclude others from appropriating the benefits.
Figure 4A and B show the societal welfare measures (excluding benefits to
R&D firms) associated with PVP and patents, respectively. These measures
are tilted in favour of research that has a long shelf life. The societal welfare
20 The research and commercial development conducted by competitors also represents the R&D
spillovers mentioned by Pardey et al. (2013).
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measure represents the current value of the research for its entire commercial
life (see expression (8)), which is longer when genetic improvements depreciate
slowly.
To better compare the differential effect of the IP protection system on soci-
etal welfare, Figure 5 depicts the equilibrium welfare under patents minus
the equilibrium welfare under PVP. Panels A and B, respectively, provide
three- and two-dimensional representations of such difference. In panel B, the
iso-welfare line that starts at the south-east corner (i.e. where g ¼ 0 and 1 2
r ¼ 1) denotes the (g, 1 2 r) parameter combinations that leave society indif-
ferent between PVP and patents. The iso-line separates the region where PVP
yields greater welfare than patents (to the east of the iso-line) from the region
where patents result in larger welfare than PVP (to the west of the iso-line).
The (g, 1 2 r) combinations corresponding to the welfare indifference
iso-line in panel B of Figure 5 are identical to (g, 12 r) combinations
Fig. 4. Equilibrium net benefits to society (excluding profits to R&D sector) under PVP and
patents. (A) PVP and (B) patents.
Fig. 5. Equilibrium net benefits to society (excluding profits to R&D sector) under patents
minus equilibrium net benefits to society (excluding profits to R&D sector) under PVP.
(A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
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leading to the same genetic improvements for PVP as for patents in panel B of
Figure 3. This result is to be expected, because the measure of societal welfare in
expression (8) simplifies to fˆ 1−1/1/[(1 − 1/1)(1 − r1−1/1)] in stationary equi-
librium. That is, ceteris paribus, societal welfare is monotonically increasing in
stationary equilibrium genetic improvements.
Graphical representations of the surpluses for the R&D industry under PVP
and patents are provided in panels A and B, respectively, of Figure 6. Under
PVP, R&D surplus increases substantially with g for low levels of g, but it
quickly reaches a plateau. PVP R&D surplus is not sensitive to the speed of
genetic stock decay, because PVP firms only capture commercial benefits
over a single period. In contrast, R&D surplus under patents strongly increases
with the commercial life of the genetic improvements, because firms holding
patents can obtain commercial benefits over an additional period and their
profits over this period increase with the life of the genetic improvement.
The differences in R&D surplus under patents and PVP are shown in
Figure 7A and B, corresponding to the three- and two-dimensional
Fig. 6. Equilibrium profits to R&D sector under PVP and patents. (A) PVP and (B) patents.
Fig. 7. Equilibrium profits to R&D sector under patents minus equilibrium profits to
R&D sector under PVP. (A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional
representation.
22 S. H. Lence et al.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/erae/article-abstract/43/1/1/2367179
by Iowa State University user
on 05 December 2017
representations, respectively. In panel B, the area to the right of the iso-line
going through the point (g ¼ 0, 1 2 r ¼ 1) represents (g, 1 2 r) combinations
for which R&D surplus under PVP is greater than R&D surplus under patents,
and the opposite is true for the area to the left of such iso-line. The most import-
ant insight provided by Figure 7 is that, in terms of R&D surplus, patents clearly
dominate PVP when both g and expected commercial life are large. This result
suggests that if R&D firms could choose g and (12 r), patents would provide
much stronger incentives than PVP to perform genetic research involving large
g and longer commercial life (i.e. smaller (1 2 r)). Relatedly, if genetic
research involves fixed costs increasing with g and with commercial life, it is
straightforward to demonstrate plausible situations in which a system with
patents would support genetic improvements involving largeg and longer com-
mercial life, but a system with PVP would not.
6.1. Reducing the length of patent protection
Figure 8 compares genetic improvements under two patent systems. The first
patent system represents the base case 10-year patent discussed earlier, and
the second has a 5-year patent protection. A negative value indicates that the
longer patent dominates. This result is true for all of the parameter values,
except for the extreme depreciation rate of (12 r) ¼ 1. With depreciation
rates approaching 100 per cent, there is no commercial value to be captured
with a longer patent. The advantage afforded by a longer patent is lowest
when the degree of research specialisation (g) is small. In this instance, firms
have little incentive to build long-term research projects because there is little
carryover benefit from previous research.
6.2. Reducing the time needed to create a new variety under PVP
Here we examine how a reduction in the length of time it takes to generate a
distinct new variety influences the PVP results. The scenario involves two
Fig. 8. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under 5-year patents minus aggregate
equilibrium genetic improvement under 10-year patents. (A) Three-dimensional representa-
tion and (B) two-dimensional representation.
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offsetting forces. Firms realise that they will have a shorter period to capture the
benefits of any research prior to the release of competitor’s varieties, which
reduces their incentive to fund research. However, a higher speed at which
new varieties can be created increases the productivity of all research, including
original research driven by IP, as well as research designed to leverage original
research done by other firms. Unlike the other scenarios, the nature of the scen-
ario itself influences the results because the scenario is about faster science, and
faster science has obvious benefits.
The results depend very much on how we address the faster science question.
If we compare genetic improvements between scenarios where the same amount
of science can be conducted (i.e. 5 years for one scenario and half of that for the
second scenario), then genetic improvements under the 5-year scenario clearly
dominate due to the lower IP protection under the shorter protection period.
However, if we compare genetic improvements over identical periods (i.e.
two 2.5-year periods for the faster scenario versus one 5-year period for
the slower scenario), the results show that there is a trade-off between the
reduced incentive to conduct research and the overall pace of research. The
system that dominates depends on the rate at which research costs are increasing
with the amount of genetic research. If costs are strongly convex in research,
then genetic improvements increase as the time needed to generate a new
variety falls. If costs are linear or close to linear in genetic research, then the
longer scenario clearly dominates. The intuition here is that under the shorter
period firms can complete two research projects at a lower overall cost than
firms operating under the longer period can complete one research project.
In reality, firms will be able to find ways around strongly convex cost func-
tions, such as by running many smaller research projects simultaneously. There-
fore, the most appropriate scenario is the one where we hold constant the amount
of science that can be completed and in this scenario societal welfare falls as
firms discover faster ways to introduce new varieties.
6.3. The impact of trade secrets
With patents, competitors can access the material in the patent application, and,
when it is legal for them to do so, they can use this patented information for their
own commercial purposes. With a trade secret they never access the original
science. The welfare impacts of the two models are remarkably similar with
the exception of long-lived technologies and less-complex research where
patents dominate because other firms benefit from information contained in
the patent. Because of the similarity of the results they are not presented here.
6.4. PVP systems versus trade secrets
We also compared a PVP system with a system of trade secrets. This comparison
produces results that are very similar to those where we compare patents with
PVP. The logic here is that the opportunity to protect research with a trade
secret incentivises long-term, complex research in much the same way as
patents do. But the use of trade secrets also reduces dissemination in much
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the same way that patents do. Consequently, reliance on trade secrets (e.g. to
protect parental lines) begins to be detrimental to social welfare when the
period of trade secret protection extends beyond the time-frame provided
either by PVP or by patents.
6.5. Patents with licensing
Figure 9 compares a system of patents with no licensing agreements against a
system of patents with licensing agreements. Licensing dominates for a large
set of combinations of g and (12 r). The intuition here is that licensing
allows society to access the new inventions in the same way as under PVP,
but this system rewards the firm that created the technology by way of licence
fees. Note that a system of patents with licences dominates a system of
patents without licences for a range of parameters that are similar to those
where PVP dominates patents. This result makes sense because licences offer
a way to allow the technology to diffuse in much the same way that PVP
does. Patents plus licensing maintains the strong incentive to conduct research
of a long-term and complex nature, while also allowing that research to be
quickly disseminated.
6.6. Is there a first-best outcome?
The licensing results are the most intriguing of the set because they seem to
suggest that one can obtain the best of both worlds under a patent plus licensing
system. Figure 10 compares genetic improvements under patents with licensing
against the maximum (best) genetic improvement attained under the alternative
systems (i.e. patents without licensing, PVP and secrets). The results indicate
that the patents with licensing scenario dominate the maximum of the alterna-
tives for a wide range of parameters. For the remaining parameter values
Fig. 9. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents with licensing minus ag-
gregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents without licensing. (A) Three-
dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
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there is no significant difference between patents with licensing and the
maximum of all of the others.
Moving from right to left across the range of depreciation rates for an inter-
mediate complexity level (e.g. g ¼ 3), the system that maximises genetic im-
provement at the right-hand side is one where firms share via licensing and
patents. This result makes sense, because improvements become obsolete
very quickly. When depreciation is high, licensing is good because it allows a
firm to use other firms’ improvements right away to reduce its own research
costs. In other words, without licensing, by the time an improvement can be
used by other firms, it is too late to dent those firms’ research costs. In the
middle range of depreciation rates, pure patents provide about the same in-
centive for research as patents with licensing. In this range the extra benefit of
being able to use other firms’ improvements right away rather than waiting
until patent expiration is much smaller, because other firms’ improvements
depreciate little while waiting until patent expiration. At the left hand side,
where the rate of depreciation is very slow, trade secrets provide approximately
the same incentive to conduct research as patents and patents with licensing. In
this region, the extra benefit from using others’ research after patent expiration is
very small, and all three systems of IP protection provide approximately the
same amount of incentives to perform research.
There is a microscopic region where PVP dominates patents with licensing.
This region involves very high g and 100 per cent depreciation. The logic here
is that the marginal benefit of conducting high g research in a world where the
technology will be redundant in one period is very small. The rate at which the
marginal benefit falls off in this area is higher for patents than for PVP. High g
research makes most sense when research conducted today goes on to improve
research productivity for several periods. The area where this result occurs is
not economically relevant, because one would not expect firms to consider
high g research for a variety that is expected to have a commercial life of
one period.
Fig. 10. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents with licensing minus
maximum aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under all other regimes. (A) Three-
dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
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In our model, all firms are identical and they optimally choose to license under
the patents with licensing scenario. This may not reflect the marketplace, either
because one firm has a dominant position or chooses not to license for strategic
reasons. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that in a marketplace where firms
are similar in size, a scenario where firms license dominates, or, is equivalent to
all other forms of IP protection.
7. Summary and conclusions
We develop an economic simulation model of the seed sector that allows us to
compare the welfare and genetic improvements under subtle changes in the IP
system. The motivation for this model is the spirited and ongoing debate on this
issue. Many seed companies, policy makers and scientists in the EU generally
favour PVP while those in the United States generally favour patent laws.
Our results show that there are circumstances under which both perspectives
are correct. Patents can incentivize firms to conduct expensive and long-lasting
research programmes of the type that lead to the development of transgenic
plants and the introduction of exotic germplasm into commercial products by
the private sector. PVP leads to faster diffusion across research firms, and in
circumstances where the improvement is expected to have a short life and
the research technology is easily transferable, this diffusion dominates the
weaker IP protection implicit in PVP.
Transgenic plants are not yet a commercial success in the EU and govern-
ments there have typically funded much of the basic work of introducing
exotic germplasm which has largely been directed towards specific quality or
disease and insect resistance genes. Therefore, the traditional breeding pro-
grammes conducted by the private sector in the EU are typically favoured
under a PVP system. Improvements made by any one firm are quickly made
available to other firms, so long as the latter use the research to generate distinct
new varieties. Horizontal diffusion fuels the rate of genetic progress (which is
also dependent upon the magnitude of incremental improvements), but it
reduces the incentive to participate in more expensive, long-lived projects.
The utility patent structure in the United States has the potential to slow
genetic improvement from more-traditional breeding programmes, because
the patent allows the original firm exclusive rights to its own research and this
slows horizontal diffusion. Our results suggest that this problem can be resolved
with a licensing programme so long as it results in a complete market for access
to the varieties on reasonable terms—whether it emerges voluntarily or is
mandated.
The results also compare patents of different lengths and show that the optimal
patent length is less than infinity and more than a single development period.
We show that when the period needed to generate a distinct new variety under
a PVP system is reduced then genetic improvement and social welfare fall for all
reasonable parameterisations.
The results of this research show that flexible approaches to IP protection, for
example by adjusting the breeders’ exemption, or by reducing incentives to
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utilise trade secrets beyond PVP or patent terms, are warranted. The results also
support a tentative conclusion that utility patents coupled with licensing domi-
nates, or is equivalent to, all other forms of IP protection.
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